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We investigate firm level financial and non-financial information and their 
association with project failure for a sample of pre-production gold 
development firms. We choose pre-revenue generating ‘single project’ 
mining companies, since project failure is synonymous with company failure 
for these firms. The setting is interesting due to the high information 
asymmetry and limitations of the GAAP-based Altman Z-score in this 
context. We apply a definition of project failure and compare both financial 
and non-financial predictors. Failure is found to be driven by whether the 
deposit is open pit or underground, and whether cash cost of production is 




During difficult economic times – such as the recent Global Financial Crisis [hereafter 
GFC] – mineral exploration and development firms in particular experience an increase in the 
frequency of bankruptcy, as commodity prices decline and essential development funding 
becomes scarce. The onset of the GFC had a predictable effect on mine closure, deferral, 
curtailment and company failure. Table 1 lists the name and date of Australian mining 
companies entering external administration following the onset of the GFC. What is 
interesting is that it is mainly single mine developers and early stage single mine production 
companies that have failed. Absent from Table 1 are the established multi mine producers 
who were beneficiaries of strong underlying commodity prices during the earlier mining 
boom, which carried over to later years through fixed prices in long-term forward contracts. 
The GFC still affected some of the mining producers’ high-risk activities, even if bankruptcy 
did not result. The impact of the GFC on companies engaging in mineral production is visible 
in Table 2. For mining explorers and developers, the onset of the GFC meant that project 
failure prediction became more important as a potential risk mitigation and avoidance tool. 
[Table 1 about here] 
Traditionally, the Altman (1968) Z-score is utilised to estimate the likelihood of firm 
bankruptcy, based upon five key financial ratios. For some types of firms, non-financial 
information compliments (or even dominates) financial information when measuring the 
creation of value (Amir and Lev, 1996). It is likely that for these firms non-financial 
information will compliment (or even dominate) the Altman Z-score in measuring the 
likelihood of failure (the inability to create value). The Altman Z-score utilises ratios based 
on sales, earnings before interest and tax, and retained profits. For development firms that are 
yet to generate any sales, the Altman Z-score will not be able to distinguish value-generating 
from value-destroying activities. The Altman Z-score also utilises a leverage ratio, whereas 
4 
most high-risk development firms do not issue debt capital.
1
 Our objective is to develop a 
model for predicting the failure of developmental mining projects based on financial and non-
financial information. 
 [Table 2 about here] 
It is puzzling, given the cyclical nature of the mining industry and its susceptibility to 
exogenous shocks like the GFC, that a positive model of mining company failure has yet to 
be developed in the Australian financial economics literature. Moreover, this question is 
arguably of additional interest owing to the industry’s sizeable contribution to the Australian 
economy. For example, a recent article in the Australian Financial Review suggests that 
mining company investment will account for 48.4% of total private capital expenditure in 
2010-2011, compared to just 11% from manufacturing.
2
 The relatively large size of the 
Australian mining industry compared to other industries has an additional benefit for the 
researcher. It means that constructing a viable sample of failed mining projects for study does 
not present a problem. 
The definitive analytical work on mine closure is Brennan and Schwartz (1985). The 
propositions of Brennan and Schwartz (1985) relating to mineral producers were empirically 
examined in Moel and Tufano (2002), who focused on mine closure for gold producers in the 
US using a sample period from 1988-1997. Our study can be distinguished from Moel and 
Tufano (2002) to the extent that our focus is gold project developers.
3
 Information asymmetry 
is arguably higher for these companies compared to established producers (Ferguson and 
Crockett, 2003), so assessing the vulnerability of early stage companies to failure will be of 
value to investors. 
                                                 
1
 The successful ex post issue of bank debt is therefore viewed as a signal of a relatively low risk project. 
However, none of the sample firms have issued any ex ante project related finance prior to the feasibility 
completion.  
2
 Australian Financial Review 26
th
 February, 2010, p.7. 
3
 For the purposes of this study, a ‘developer’ is defined as a mining venture that has completed a feasibility 
study but is yet to commence production activities. 
5 
The failure model articulated in this study features single project gold developers who 
in the development phase record only minor product revenues, although ultimately may or 
may not end up in production. The advantage of considering this type of firm is that 
information asymmetry is higher given the absence of an established earnings history. 
Further, since the focus of a development company is typically on a single project, deposit 
properties can be contrasted with traditional financial distress predictors such as the Altman 
Z-score in assessments of project outcome.  
We contribute to the extant literature in three ways. Firstly, by examining 
developmental mining projects, we highlight a setting where applying the traditional distress 
prediction model, the Altman Z-score, is problematic. Further studies may consider other 
development settings where the accounting-based Altman Z-score is similarly inapplicable 
(such as start-up IT and biotechnology firms). We therefore contribute to understanding the 
limitations of the Altman Z-score, and encourage future research in this area. 
Secondly, failure prediction is particularly important during tough economic times, 
such as the recent GFC. Therefore solving the problems inherent in applying the traditional 
Altman Z-score to pre-production mining firms has also become important. In lieu of the 
deficiencies of accounting-based financial ratios for development firms, we offer an alternate 
model that emphasises the role of context-specific non-financial information in predicting the 
failure of developmental mining firms. 
Last, we make a contribution to managers and capital providers associated with 
development mining firms by empirically highlighting the information that is relevant to 
estimating the vulnerability of mining development projects to failure. Highlighting the 
information that is useful to decision-makers in this context also adds to our understanding of 
the importance of non-financial disclosure. 
 
6 
THE MINE LIFE CYCLE 
In terms of structure, the Australian mining industry is typified by a large number of 
early-stage exploration firms, a mid-sized number of middle-stage mine developers 
(successful explorers) and a small number of late-stage multi-mine producers. As depicted in 
Table 1, the probability of a multi-mine producer failing compared to failure of a single mine 
developer is much lower, although it does happen from time to time (e.g. the failure of Sons 
of Gwalia in 2004).
4
  
The development life cycle generally commences with a mineral explorer either 
applying for a mining tenement or making a tenement/project acquisition. The explorer then 
begins an initial evaluation phase which may include surface geochemical sampling and 
mapping or ground geophysics. If initial indicators look promising, sampling through either 
costeaning or shallow air core drilling may be undertaken. For prospects demonstrating 
greater potential, more expensive and deeper reverse circulation (RC) drilling is then 
conducted. Ideally the firm seeks a discovery, in which case the explorer will conduct further 
RC and diamond drilling campaigns with the objective of conducting metallurgical test work 
and producing a defined resource.
5
 
Once a resource has been defined, the company will typically conduct a scoping study 
with the objective of producing some preliminary ‘ballpark’ or ‘back of the envelope’ 
economics in order to justify further drilling and a more intensive pre-feasibility study. 
Should the pre-feasibility study be successfully completed it will lead to the commencement 
of an often costly and lengthy ‘full’ or ‘bankable’ or ‘definitive’ feasibility study. The 
developer must then secure regulatory approvals along with mine financing before 
                                                 
4
 Sons of Gwalia was the victim of a toxic hedge book. Other notable hedging casualties include Pasminco. 
5 Projects that are acquired may have certain preliminary milestones such as resource definition already 
completed 
7 
construction and production may begin.
6
 Our study examines a sample of pre-cash flow 
generating gold development companies that have reported the completion of a feasibility 
study to the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX).
7
  
Given the capital constraints imposed on exploration firms, the fact that these firms 
have minimal product revenues (less than 5% of market capitalisation) normally implies that 
they are also single project firms, since developing two projects simultaneously is less 
common due to deposit complexities and technical and financial limitations. Consequently 
our sample constitutes smaller gold development firms that hold an existing deposit 
(normally only one) where the firm has invested in the completion of a feasibility study as a 
means to ultimately developing that deposit. 
 
DEFINITION OF FAILURE 
Altman (1968) includes a simple definition of failure – firms filing for bankruptcy. 
This definition would unnecessarily restrict our sample to total company failure (as applied in 
table 1 – which includes 2 firms form the study sample).  Brennan and Schwartz (1985) and 
Moel and Tufano (2002) principally examine failure for producing mining projects, defining 
failure with reference to the closure and/or abandonment of a previously operating mine. For 
development mining projects, Brennan and Schwartz (1985) define failure as “postponing an 
investment decision” where an ‘investment decision’ relates to the decision “to proceed with 
construction.” 
                                                 
6
 Junior mining exploration and development companies face many difficulties in transitioning to producer 
status. Despite significant exploration effort, ‘greenfield’ precious and base metal discoveries are surprisingly 
rare events in Australia. In Australia the number of recent +1million ounce gold ‘greenfields’ discoveries are 
very small. The list of projects post 2000 would include Thunderbox (DalrympleResources and Lionore 
Mining), Tropicana (Independence Group and Anglogold Ashanti) and McPhillamys (Alkane Resources and 
Newmont). 
7
 We note that the majority of our announcements are referred to as feasibility completions, although some firms 
will subsequently undertake an additional ‘optimised’ or ‘definitive’ feasibility study. In such cases however the 
market has a good idea of project economics from the feasibility completion. In a small number of cases we 
utilise ‘pre-feasibility’ or ‘scoping’ study completions since these were the last feasibility related 
announcements prior to mine financing. We acknowledge the use of differing terminology by firms is a 
limitation in the study. 
8 
Given the sequential nature of the mine life cycle, care needs to be taken in defining 
‘failure’ corresponding to the feasibility completion milestone. For example the definition of 
‘failure’ is not as simple as an ultimate mine closure, since some deposits will never get to the 
production stage. We adopt a failure definition for development projects derived from 
propositions in Brennan and Schwartz (1985) and classify a project as failed if it has one of 
the following attributes: 
1. The project fails to attract mine financing in the 5 years following feasibility 
completion;  
2. The project is disposed of in the 5 years following feasibility completion;  
3. The project is deferred or production is suspended within 5 years of feasibility 
completion; or 
4. The company enters into external administration within 5 years of feasibility 
completion. 
 
FACTORS ASSOCIATED WITH MINE FAILURE 
Moel and Tufano (2002) empirically examine factors associated with mine failure for 
producing mines. Although these factors largely overlap with the factors associated with 
mine failure for developing (pre-producing) mines, there are also some differences (such as 
development costs). By choosing to examine pre-cash flow generating firms that are largely 
single project, we are able to focus on a much ‘cleaner’ sample (less project-firm distortions) 
and the attributes of gold mining projects themselves can potentially yield valuable insights 
into failure in this industry more generally. We compare these idiosyncratic gold deposit 
attributes against traditional financial distress predictors applied in the financial economics 
literature. Our model predictors include the following factors: 
Gold price levels and gold price changes 
9 
Following Moel and Tufano (2002), we consider gold price levels and changes 
subsequent to the feasibility study as a potential predictor of project failure. Managers are 
likely to have a greater propensity to abandon a project if the commodity price environment 
is less favourable (Moel and Tufano, 2002). We investigate for our sample whether there is 
an association between project failure and gold price levels and changes subsequent to 
feasibility completion with our proxies GOLD_PRICE and GOLD_MOVE, respectively, 
which pick up levels in gold price at the completion of the feasibility study and changes in 
gold prices over the following 5 year period. 
Nature of mining activities – underground or open pit 
Mineral deposits typically come in two forms – either open pit or underground. With 
open pit deposits, mine overburden is removed exposing the ore body allowing removal of 
ore grade material to the processing plant. Open pit mining is preferred when the ore body is 
situated in relatively close proximity to the surface. This feature minimises the extent of 
costly waste material to be removed, thus lowering expected cash costs. In contrast, 
underground operations are higher risk with deeper ore bodies and safety issues from possible 
rock falls or flooding.
8
 Given the higher risk and greater information asymmetry involved in 
complex underground mines relative to open pit mines, mine failure may be more pervasive 
for underground mines. We investigate whether this association is evident in our sample with 
our dummy variable OPEN_PIT. Moel and Tufano (2002) include historic operating costs as 
a factor associated with failure, but not all feasibility reports disclose predicted costs (as 
discussed later). Our OPEN_PIT variable can be interpreted as a proxy for a major 
determinant of development and operating costs. Moel and Tufano (2002) include their own 
open pit variable to proxy for the costs of shutting and re-opening a producing mine. 
Toll Milling  
                                                 
8
 An example of an Australian underground mine impacted by rock falls is the Beaconsfield Mine in Tasmania. 
Other underground mines have been impacted by flooding such as the Browns Creek Gold mine in New South 
Wales.  
10 
A control for firms electing to undertake toll milling arrangements where ore from an 
existing deposit owned by the company is processed through third party production facilities 
is included in the model. Toll milling removes the necessity for the construction of an on-site 
processing plant and the need for associated construction financing and hence substantially 
lowers project risk. A dummy variable TOLL_MILLING is used to indicate toll milling 
arrangements. Our TOLL_MILLING variable can be interpreted as a proxy for a major 
determinant of development costs. 
Second Hand Plant 
In their feasibility studies, certain firms specify the use of second hand plant as a 
means to reducing the project development costs, which may signal a lower quality project. 
There are often issues associated with second hand plants being tailored to a new deposit. The 
use of second hand plant also signals capital scarcity in the sense that the firm may not be 
able to afford new plant as either debt or equity financing is not forthcoming. A dummy 
variable (coded 1 for second hand plant usage) is included in the failure model 
(SECOND_HAND). 
Capitalised exploration expenditure 
Exploration and development companies are allowed to defer exploration expenditure 
where the future of the project is uncertain under the Area of Interest Method allowed under 
AASB 6 through grandfathering provisions in IFRS transition.
9
 Higher amounts of capitalised 
exploration may signal a better quality project (lower likelihood of failure). However, a lower 
amount may reflect accounting conservatism which may signal conservatism more broadly in 
terms of project development assumptions and hence greater likelihood of a successful 
development. Given competing arguments for the direction of the association, we pose this as 
                                                 
9
 IFRS transition does not affect this study due to specific grandfathering provisions in IFRS 6 which: 
‘Permits entities to continue to use their existing accounting policies for exploration and evaluation assets, 
provided that such policies result in information that is relevant and reliable’ (Source: Deloitte IAS Plus, 
January 2005 – Special Edition. http://www.iasplus.com/iasplus/0501ifrs6.pdf (Link active 08/10/2010.) ) 
11 
an empirical question. DEFERRED_ASSET proxies for the stock of deferred or capitalised 
exploration and evaluation expenditure reported by the company in the fiscal year prior to 
feasibility completion.  
Cash Costs 
The expected cash cost of production is central to the assessment of a deposit’s 
viability (Moel and Tufano, 2002). However, not all projects disclose cash costs upon 
completion of their project feasibility study. Arguably, the non disclosure of cash costs is bad 
news regarding project viability. Accordingly, we include a dummy variable CASH_COST 
indicating whether cash costs are released as part of the feasibility study disclosure.  
Altman Z-score 
Altman (1968) identifies financial ratios that predict corporate bankruptcy. Whilst 
financial information for developmental mining companies may be less useful in predicting 
project outcomes, we include the Altman Z-score (ALTMAN_Z) in our model consistent with 
prior literature – predicting a negative association between the Z-score (including its 
individual components) and project failure. 
Company Size 
Following Moel and Tufano (2002), we include company size as an additional control 
variable. Consistent with the notion of risk being inversely related to company size, we 
expect larger development companies to be less likely to fail. We include market 
capitalisation recorded on month end prior to the feasibility release as our proxy for firm size 
(SIZE).  
Informed Shareholders 
Moel and Tufano (2002) included five variables on ownership structure, but none 
were statistically significant. We include a measure of investor sophistication based on 
director’s shareholding which is scaled by issued capital to provide a measure of the 
12 
director’s percentage ownership in a company’s issued capital (DIRSH). We do not specify a 
sign on this co-efficient due to competing explanations. For example, given the high 
information asymmetry present in gold developers, it could be argued that higher director 
ownership may signal positive private information and thus director ownership is negatively 
related to failure. Alternatively, higher information asymmetry may allow large director 
shareholdings or the presence of block-holders to more effectively expropriate wealth from 
smaller shareholders. In this case we would expect higher director shareholding to be 
positively related to failure. Sensitivity tests are also conducted based on the percentage 
shareholding of the top 20 shareholders (TOP_20) which proxies for the level block-holders 
on the company’s share register. 
Cash Burn 
Prior to the commencement of operations of a revenue generating project, 
development firms’ only source of cash is from capital providers – typically the equity 
market (due to the high risk involved with development firms). Raising additional equity 
funds to pay for further project development can be difficult, particularly in tough economic 
times such as the GFC. Firms with relatively more cash (and other financial assets) on hand 
will be able to survive longer without the need to return to the equity market or generate 
funds internally. We expect a negative association between the ratio of cash on hand to 
annual cash requirements (CASH_BURN). 
 
DATA 
The sample comprises 85 gold projects representing the full sample of known 
feasibility disclosures made by pre-production single-project gold developers over the 
13 
January 1990 to December 2007 sample period.
10
 The sample was hand collected from text 
searches of the ASX announcement archive on Huntleys Datanalysis which was cross 
checked on Factiva using keywords such as ‘feasibility’ and ‘gold’. Given that mining 
projects are often polymetallic, to be considered a ‘gold’ project the feasibility study needed 
to report expected revenues of at least 60% gold. This was determined by utilizing feasibility 
report production forecasts at spot commodity prices rates at the feasibility completion date. 
The 60% rule conforms to industry heuristics in terms of what constitutes a ‘gold’ project.11 
Descriptive statistics reported in Table 3 for the proportion of gold product revenue to market 
capitalisation (PRODUCT_SALES), indicates that 72 firms or 85.7% of the sample report 
zero gold sales and 98.8% of firms report PRODUCT_SALES of 2% or less of market 
capitalisation.
12
 This confirms that these companies are non-production companies, with 
some sourcing minor gold revenues from net smelter returns or royalties derived from prior 




Summary statistics in Table 3 depict 46% meet the FAILED_PROJECT definition 
consistent with assertions that gold project development is a high risk undertaking. In terms 
of predictors, descriptive statistics reported in Table 3 for OPEN_PIT indicate that nearly 
65% of projects constitute open pit as opposed to underground mines. Table 3 also indicates 
that the average spot gold price was $431.10 USD/oz (GOLD_PRICE), whilst the average 
                                                 
10
 This sample period represents a ‘pre-GFC’ period so as to remove any effects of the GFC on the feasibility 
report process. The key analysis of this study relates to the 5 year (or less) period following the public release of 
the feasibility report, which will include the GFC for appropriate observations. Of these 85 firms, 2 are included 
in table 1, 5 are pre-GFC company failures, 32 met our broader definition of failure – comprising 20 disposals 
and 12 deferrals – and 46 are non-failure control firms. 
11
 ‘A sure hand at the wheel’, The Australian, 4/09/2010, p. 26.  
12
 The variable PRODUCT_SALES represents the amount of gold sales revenue scaled by market capitalisation. 
This data is collected to ensure that all firms in the sample are ‘pre-production’ firms. 
14 
change in the gold price over the five years subsequent to completion of the feasibility reports 
(GOLD_MOVE) is 75%. Cash costs are disclosed by 80% of firms (CASH_COSTS), whilst 
13% of firms plan to produce through a mill owned and operated by another entity 
(TOLL_MILLING). Second hand plant is articulated as their preferred treatment option by 
27% of projects (SECOND_HAND).  
In terms of capitalised exploration and evaluation expenditure, the mean is $9.23 
million (DEFERRED_ASSET). The average percentage holding by the TOP_20 is 57.7%. 
Ownership by the board of directors (DIRSH) shows an average shareholding of 15% by all 
board participants, which is not surprising given that small mining companies are routinely 
founded by a geologist(s) who often retain(s) a large percentage of their companies issued 
capital post the IPO. The average market capitalisation of the sample is $17 million (SIZE). 
The average number of years of cash (and other financial assets) on hand is 1.7 years 
(CASH_BURN). 
The average Altman Z-score is only 0.5 (ALTMAN_Z, well within Altman’s < 1.81 
distress zone) and the maximum is only 2.66 (outside Altman’s > 2.99 safe zone). Of our 
sample, 91.8% of firms have a Z-score of less than 1.81 (‘distress zone’) although only half 
(46%) of our sample actually met the project failure definition within the next 5 years. To 
further investigate the application of the Altman Z-score to our sample of gold mining 
development firms, the individual components of the score are examined. 
The average proportion of working capital (WCAP) is 20% (in between Altman’s 
bankrupt average of -6% and non-bankrupt average of 41%). The average proportion of 
retained profits (ACC_LOSS, -151%) is well below Altman’s bankrupt average (-63%), as is 
return-on-assets (ROA, -62% is well below -32%) and asset turnover
13
 (ASSET_TURN, 6% as 
compared to 150%). These averages are to be expected for development firms yet to generate 
                                                 
13
 We note that Altman’s asset turnover was limited to sales revenue whereas our measure includes total revenue 
as most development firms have no operating revenue. 
15 
sales revenue despite several years of development expenses. Of interest is the interpretation 
of the proportion of retained profits. For Altman, more retained profits is an indication of 
more years of business success; whereas for development firms more accumulated losses 
(i.e., negative retained profits) are an indication of more years of funded development 
activity. Therefore for development firms, the interpretation of the retained profits ratio as a 
measure of bankruptcy risk is the opposite of post-development firms. 
Even after substituting Total Liabilities for Debt, the leverage ratio (LEVERAGE; 
inverse of the traditional debt-to-equity ratio) average of 7,819% is still well above Altman’s 
non-bankrupt average of 248%. By Altman’s interpretation, a low leverage ratio is a sign that 
the firm is close to bankruptcy as the market value of the firm’s equity has declined 
dramatically. However for development firms, high leverage ratios are a natural consequence 
of the reality that they are too risky for debt capital. Therefore for development firms, the 
interpretation of the leverage ratio as a measure of bankruptcy risk is the opposite of post-
development firms.
14
 Overall, the traditional interpretation of the Altman Z-score does not 
appear to be a valid reflection of bankruptcy risk for development firms. 
 
MODEL SPECIFICATION  
We fit a logistic regression model where the dependent variable FAILED_PROJECT 
is coded 1 if it meets the aforementioned failure definition, and 0 otherwise. The model is 
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We first explore the relationship between the Altman Z-score and failure by 
correlating FAILED_PROJECT with ALTMAN_Z and then regressing FAILED_PROJECT on 
the ALTMAN_Z ratio alone. In each case the ALTMAN_Z is insignificant at the p<.10 level 
with a pseudo R
2
 of .008 and a Chi-square statistic of 0.673, insignificant at p=.412. The 
model does not correctly classify any companies as failed. We interpret these univariate 
results as consistent with the Altman Z-score being of less significance in this failure setting. 
Logistic regression results for the full model specification in Equation (1) are reported 
in Table 4. Model 1 exhibits significant explanatory power with a Chi-square statistic of 
24.29, significant at p<.01 and reports a pseudo R
2
 of .25. Classificatory success is 
encouraging, with 59% of projects successfully classified by the model. In terms of 
significant predictors, consistent with expectations, OPEN_PIT, the proxy for development 
type, has a negative co-efficient significant at p<.10. As discussed above, underground 
projects involve higher information asymmetry potentially leading to a greater expected 
failure rate, and consequently a negative co-efficient on OPEN_PIT. The other significant 
variable in model 1 is CASH_COSTS. Where these are disclosed, there is lower failure 
(p=.006) – consistent with our prediction that the disclosure of cash costs is a signal for 
higher project quality. 
 [Table 4 about here] 
Model 2 replicates Model 1 with the inclusion of the traditional Altman Z-score. 
Interestingly, the financial ratio-based ALTMAN_Z is insignificant at the p=.10 level. Whilst 
the sign is consistent with expectations, overall our results suggest that the ALTMAN_Z, on its 
own, is not associated with failure in this context, nor on a multivariate level with suitable 
other firm and deposit level controls. We interpret this as evidence that there are more 
important determinants of failure in this context. Reporting a negative and marginally 
17 
significant co-efficient is TOLL_MILLING, significant at p<.10, suggesting failure is lower 
where third party production facilities are utilized. 
Altman (2000) re-examined the Z-score in the more specific contexts of private firms 
and non-manufacturing firms, suggesting modified variable weights and classification zones. 
Following Altman (2000), in Model 3 we remove the traditional Altman (1968) weighting 
constraints included in Model 2. Model 3 therefore includes the five component variables of 
the Altman Z-score. The only Z-score component significant at the p=.10 level is the 
proportion of retained profits (ACC_LOSS), albeit with a positive coefficient. As mentioned 
above, the positive coefficient on ACC_LOSS (contradictory to Altman, 1968) is likely 





Feasibility study completion is a key mine development milestone. Our descriptive 
research study aims to extend the failure prediction literature by exploring a model of failure 
for developer mining firms. Prior failure prediction research – such as Altman (1968), and 
Moel and Tufano (2002) – is difficult to apply to development firms due to the absence of 
cash-flow generating activities.  We utilise a logistic regression model based on the success 
or failure of single-project gold mining firms subsequent to disclosure of a feasibility study. 
Results indicate that failure prediction for gold developers is primarily determined by non-
financial information. Failed projects are more likely to be underground projects. Non-
disclosure of cash costs of production in the feasibility completion is another key predictor of 
                                                 
15 We run sensitivity tests on within sample firms jointly developing a project along with a small number of 
companies who attempt underground development with a separate underground feasibility study following the 
successful conclusion of an open pit campaign. A small number of firms fostering a second attempt at 
developing the same project after a prior failed attempt are also omitted in further sensitivity tests.  Results of 
such tests are similar to those reported in Table 4. Models 1-3 are re-run with TOP_20 as the proxy for informed 
shareholding as opposed to DIRSH. Results on all such tests are similar to those reported in Table 4. 
18 
failure. Interestingly, traditional financial predictors such as the Altman Z-score do not 
perform as well in terms of failure prediction in this context. 
 
The inferences we draw may be generalisable to other settings, such as extractive 
development projects listed on other exchanges, extractive development projects for other 
commodity types, multi-project producing mining firms with significant development 
activities, and, on a conceptual level, development-stage-enterprises in other sectors. 
However, there are limitations with the approach we use relating to omitted and potentially 
important predictive factors; such as governance quality, a likely determinant in the long-
term success of mining project development. We expect the inclusion of such factors is likely 
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Table 1:  ASX listed mining companies entering external administration between Jan 
2007-Mar 2010 
 
Date Company Name Main Product Deposit Location 
30/01/2007 BMA Gold Gold Queensland 
28/04/2007 Gleneagle Gold Gold Western Australia 
18/12/2007 Lafayette Mining Ltd Base Metals, Gold Philippines 
8/02/2008 View Resources Gold Western Australia 
10/07/2008 Monarch Gold Gold Western Australia 
29/08/2008 Monto Minerals Mineral Sands Queensland 
21/10/2008 Matilda Minerals Mineral Sands Northern Territory 
28/10/2008 Tamaya Resources Copper Chile 
3/11/2008 Macmin Silver Silver Queensland 
11/11/2008 Matrix Metals Copper Queensland 
21/11/2008 Aluminex Resources Limited Bauxite Western Australia 
27/11/2008 Copperco Copper Queensland 
8/01/2009 Goldstar Resources Gold Victoria 
29/01/2009 Compass Resources Copper Northern Territory 
27/02/2009 GBS Gold (Australia) Gold Western Australia 
23/04/2009 Albidon Nickel Zambia 
10/08/2009 Bounty Mining Ltd Coal/Tech Queensland 




 Table 2:  Producer mine closures and project output curtailments and deferrals 
 
Date Company Newswire Header (Summary) 
13/01/2007 Bendigo Mining Bendigo Mining's shock decision to shut down its $300 million-plus Kangaroo Flat mine 
30/01/2007 BMA Gold 
Announced the closure of Twin Hills mine, 200km west of Mackay and "a managed program of surplus 
asset sales 
30/04/2007 Xstrata  Possible closure of Xstrata Plc.'s McArthur River lead-zinc mine 
18/09/2007 Mincor /  Tectonic Closure of RAV8 mine 
7/04/2008 Metals X Metals X has announced that 100 jobs will be lost when the Collingwood Tin Mine is closed in June. 
14/07/2008 Teck Cominco Ltd Teck Cominco Ltd said to close the Lennard Shelf lead-zinc mine in western Australia in August 
21/08/2008 Perilya Ltd Australia's Perilya Ltd said to cut its zinc output by almost half due to low prices 
8/09/2008 Intec Ltd  Intec Ltd said had suspended operations at its Hellyer Zinc Concentrate Project 
10/09/2008 OZ Minerals Ltd  
Australian miner OZ Minerals Ltd said plans to cut zinc output at its Golden Grove mine in Australia by 
35-40 percent 




Cost pressures are constraining development of Newmont Mining Corp's Boddington goldcopper project 
in Western Australia 
17/10/2008 Norilsk Nickel  Norilsk Nickel said it will halt production at its Cawse laterite nickel operation in Western Australia 




Newmont Mining Corp said its planned start-up of the Boddington gold-copper mine in Australia has 
been delayed several months 
30/10/2008 Kagara Ltd  Australian miner Kagara Ltd cut its 2008/09 zinc production target by 12.5 percent 
30/10/2008 Mincor Resources Nl 
Australian miner Mincor Resources Nl said it expects nickel ore output to be 16,000-19,000 tonnes in 
fiscal 2009, down from original plan 
7/11/2008 CBH Resources Ltd 
Australia's CBH Resources Ltd said it will cut lead-zinc mine output by a third in the 12 months to June 
30, 2009 




Australia's Copernicus nickel mine has been shut indefinitely one of its owners Thundelarra Exploration 
Ltd says 
24/11/2008 Rio Tinto Rio Tinto cuts output temporarily by one-third at Lynemouth aluminium smelter in England 
25/11/2008 OZ Minerals Ltd  
Oz Minerals Ltd to cut output at Century zinc mine by 4 percent in 2009 and delay $321 million of 
copper and gold projects 
25/11/2008 BHP Billiton 
BHP Billiton to continue to review the operating performance and future value of its Ravensthorpe and 
Yabulu operations 
25/11/2008 Norilsk Nickel  Norilsk Nickel suspends production at Waterloo and Silver Swan mines in Western Australia 
26/11/2008 Straits Resources Ltd  
Australian miner Straits Resources Ltd will scale back next year's production target at its Tritton copper 
mine to 2,200 tonnes a month 
26/11/2008 Talison Minerals 
Australia's Talison Minerals, which supplies about a third of the world's tantalum, suspends mining 
indefinitely 
27/11/2008 BHP Billiton BHP Billiton delays plans to build $120 million molybdenum processing plant at Escondida mine in Chile 
3/12/2008 OceanaGold  OceanaGold puts on hold Didipio copper-gold project in the Philippines 
3/12/2008 BHP Billiton BHP Billiton temporarily cuts manganese output at Samancor operation 
9/12/2008 Xstrata  Xstrata says has cut ore production by 20 percent at its McArthur River lead-zinc mine in Australia 
15/12/2008 OM Holdings Ltd  OM Holdings Ltd to slash manganese output in Australia by nearly 30 percent next year 
19/12/2008 OZ Minerals Ltd  Oz Minerals Ltd suspends operations at small Avebury nickel mine 
7/01/2009 Aditya Birla Minerals 
Aditya Birla Minerals Ltd places Mt Gordon copper mine in Queensland, Australia on care and 
maintenance 
13/01/2009 OZ Minerals Ltd  Oz Minerals Ltd said to put Scuddles mine at its Golden Grove project on care and maintenance 
13/01/2009 Rio Tinto Rio Tinto shelves plan to extend Northparkes copper mine in Australia as it slashes capital spending 
13/01/2009 Xstrata  
Xstrata said it restructuring lead-zinc operations at its Mt Isa mining and processing complex in 
Queensland, Australia.  
20/01/2009 Rio Tinto 
Rio Tinto Alcan said plans to cut another six percent of aluminium output and will also cut alumina 
production, shed 1,100 employees to cut costs 
21/01/2009 BHP Billiton 
BHP Billiton will close its Ravensthorpe nickel mine in Australia and reduce activity at Mount Keith 
nickel mine 
7/04/2009 Rio Tinto 
Rio Tinto said it would cut bauxite production at its Weipa mine in northeastern Australia by about 23 
percent.  
9/04/2009 Xstrata  
Xstrata Plc said it planned to suspend operations at its Sinclair nickel mine in Australia in August if 
metals prices did not rebound 
24/04/2009 BHP Billiton 
BHP Billiton said the viability of its Bayside aluminium smelter in South Africa was at risk following a 
sharp fall in demand  
29/04/2009 Alcoa 
Alcoa Inc said to cut aluminium production at Portland smelter in Australia by a further 38,000 tonnes to 
305,000 tonnes per year 
12/05/2009 BHP Billiton 
BHP Billiton said planned to stop mining at the Rocky's Reward open-pit mine at the Leinster Nickel 
Operation in Australia 
3/07/2009 BHP Billiton 
BHP Billiton retreated further from high-cost nickel operations, announcing the sale of its Yabulu 




Table 3:  Descriptive Statistics 
 
  Mean Std. Dev Maximum Minimum Skewness Kurtosis 
 
            
GOLD_PRICE 431.1 130.86 795.25 254.6 1.05 0.36 
GOLD_MOVE 0.75 0.71 1.92 -0.35 -0.35 -1.35 
DEFERRED_ASSET 9.23 11.45 59.93 0 2.38 6.39 
ALTMAN_Z 0.5 0.69 2.66 -0.05 2.08 3.29 
WCAP 0.2 0.23 0.87 -0.18 0.96 0.67 
ACC_LOSS -1.51 1.99 0.02 -7.53 -1.89 2.88 
ROA -0.62 0.38 0.04 -1.62 -2.18 4.18 
LEVERAGE 78.19 113.03 414.31 1.21 2.1 3.37 
ASSET_TURN 0.06 0.08 0.31 0 2.25 4.19 
SIZE 17.05 1.2 20.04 12.97 -0.45 1.64 
DIRSH 0.15 0.14 0.55 0 1.12 0.45 
TOP20 57.7 14.78 96.29 30.71 0.26 -0.37 
CASH_BURN 1.69 2.33 10 0 2.51 5.99 
PRODUCT_SALES 0 0.01 0.05 0 7.21 57.72 
FAILED_PROJECT 45.88%           
OPEN_PIT 64.71%           
TOLL_MILLING 12.94%           
SECOND_HAND 27.06%           
CASH_COSTS 80.00%           
       Definitions 
     GOLD_PRICE = Spot price for gold (USD/oz) at feasibility release 
 GOLD_MOVE = % change in gold price over 5 years after feasibility release. 
 DEFERRED_ASSET = Amount of deferred or capitalised exploration and evaluation expenditure in millions of dollars. 
ALTMAN_Z = Altman Z-score (each of 5 components winsorised at 97th percentile). 
WCAP = (Current Assets - Current Liabilities) / Total Assets 
  ACC_LOSS = Retained Profits (Accumulated Losses) / Total Assets 
 ROA = EBIT / Total Assets 
    LEVERAGE = Market capitalisation / Total Liabilities 
  ASSET_TURN = Total Revenues / Total Assets 
   SIZE = Log of market capitalisation sourced from SPPR measured at month end prior to feasibility release. 
DIRSH = % shareholding of the board of directors. 
   TOP20 = Proportion of the company’s shares held be the top 20 shareholders. 
 CASH_BURN = (Cash + Current Receivables + Current Investments) / (Cashflow from Operations, including Exploration & 
Development payments) 
PRODUCT_SALES = Gold sales revenue divided by firm market capitalisation at feasibility release. 
FAILED_PROJECT = Coded '1' if the project is failed as defined within the text, else '0'. 
OPEN_PIT = Coded '1' if the project is an open pit mining operation, '0' for underground operation. 
TOLL_MILLING = Coded '1' if the processing option is a toll milling arrangement, else '0'. 
SECOND_HAND = Coded ‘1’ if second hand plant nominated as preferred process option. 




 Table 3:  Project Failure Models 
 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Dependent Variable   FAILED_PROJECT FAILED_PROJECT FAILED_PROJECT* 
Right Hand SideVariables: 
Exp. 
Sign Estimate Wald -stat Prob*  Estimate Wald -stat Prob*  Estimate 
Wald -
stat Prob*  
Intercept   9.572 4.459 0.035 9.186 4.148 0.042 11.044 4.854 0.028 
SIZE  -  -0.404 2.221 0.136 -0.368 1.881 0.170 -0.422 2.040 0.153 
OPEN_PIT  -  -1.276 5.034 0.025 -1.175 4.155 0.042 -1.485 5.440 0.020 
GOLD_PRICE  -  -0.001 0.064 0.801 0.000 0.011 0.917 -0.001 0.155 0.693 
GOLD_MOVE  -  0.112 0.081 0.776 0.013 0.001 0.975 0.241 0.294 0.588 
TOLL_MILLING  -  -1.565 2.663 0.103 -1.767 3.012 0.083 -1.334 1.658 0.198 
SECOND_HAND + -0.224 0.129 0.719 -0.223 0.125 0.724 -0.407 0.377 0.539 
DEFERRED_ASSET +/- 0.000 0.000 0.993 0.000 0.001 0.973 0.000 0.270 0.603 
CASH_COSTS  -  -2.229 7.423 0.006 -2.397 7.944 0.005 -2.526 8.099 0.004 
DIRSH  +/-  1.715 0.768 0.381 2.477 1.349 0.245 2.294 1.149 0.284 
CASH_BURN - -0.077 0.376 0.540 -0.105 0.652 0.419 -0.186 1.345 0.246 
ALTMAN_Z -       -0.528 1.409 0.235       
WCAP -             0.184 0.017 0.898 
ACC_LOSS +/-             0.479 3.749 0.053 
ROA +/-             -0.531 0.309 0.578 
LEVERAGE +/-             -0.003 1.347 0.246 
ASSET_TURN -             4.815 1.092 0.296 
                      
Chi-square (p-value)     24.29 0.007   25.70 0.007   30.78 0.009 
Pseudo R2     0.25     0.26     0.30   
% correctly classified as failed     59.0     61.5     64.1   
Sample Size     N=85     N=85     N=85   
           *All p-values are two-tailed tests 
          Variables Descriptions 
          FAILED_PROJECT = Coded '1' if the project is failed as defined within the text, else '0'. 
     SIZE = Log of market capitalisation sourced from SPPR measured at month end prior to feasibility release. 
   
24 
OPEN_PIT = Coded '1' if the project is an open pit mining operation, '0' for underground operation. 
    
GOLD_PRICE = Spot price for gold (USD/oz) at feasibility release 
       GOLD_MOVE = % change in gold price over 5 years after feasibility release. 
      TOLL_MILLING = Coded '1' if the processing option is a toll milling arrangement, else '0'. 
    SECOND_HAND = Coded ‘1’ if second hand plant nominated as preferred process option. 
    DEFERRED_ASSET = Amount of deferred or capitalised exploration and evaluation expenditure in millions of dollars. 
  CASH_COSTS = Coded ‘1’ if cash cost of production is disclosed in the feasibility release. 
    DIRSH = % shareholding of the board of directors. 
        CASH_BURN = (Cash + Current Receivables + Current Investments) / (Cashflow from Operations, including Exploration & Development payments) 
ALTMAN_Z = Altman Z score (each of 5 components winsorised at 97th percentile). 
     
WCAP = (Current Assets - Current Liabilities) / Total Assets 
       ACC_LOSS = Retained Profits (Accumulated Losses) / Total Assets 
       ROA = EBIT / Total Assets 
          LEVERAGE = Market capitalisation / Total Liabilities 
        ASSET_TURN = Total Revenues / Total Assets 
         
